The Trump administration estimates its rollback of federal fuel economy requirements will cut the average cost of a new vehicle by $1,300 — money the Department of Transportation says a family could otherwise spend on insurance, repairs, or a down payment. The rule, finalized by Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, loosens the pressure on automakers to raise average fuel economy (the miles-per-gallon average a manufacturer must hit across all the vehicles it sells) across their lineups, giving them room to build cheaper, more varied products.

For context, the average transaction price of a new vehicle has climbed nearly 30%, from $38,948 in December 2019 to $50,562 in September 2026, according to Kelley Blue Book. Cars remain the backbone of American commuting: Census data show 78.4% of workers — roughly 130 million people — get to work by car, truck, or van. The DOT projects the new rule will save Americans $138 billion over the next five years.

What does the rollback change in practice?

The core shift is flexibility. Electric vehicles suit some buyers; hybrids suit others; and millions of families, the administration argues, will keep preferring gas-powered cars and trucks for price, range, or simple personal preference. Rather than pushing manufacturers toward one technology, the rule lets them sell the mix consumers actually want.

Ted Ellis, deputy director for Energy & Environment policy at the America First Policy Institute, frames the stakes bluntly: "The car of the future should earn its place in the American driveway. It should not need Washington to choose it first."

How many jobs were on the line?

A 2024 analysis by the America First Policy Institute modeled what happens to auto manufacturing employment as conventional vehicles lose market share:

• Nearly 123,000 net auto-manufacturing job losses in a scenario where electric vehicles rise to 67% of new-vehicle sales.
• Approximately 191,000 jobs lost under a complete ban on new gasoline and hybrid vehicles.
• Roughly 37,000 lost auto-manufacturing jobs in Michigan alone under a full-ban scenario — and not just in assembly plants, but across companies making engines, transmissions, fuel systems, and other components.

"As hard as it may be to imagine a total ban, America was rapidly heading in that direction," Ellis writes.

What was the previous administration's trajectory?

The Biden administration's record, as laid out in the piece, moved in steps:

• A 50%-by-2030 target for EV sales, set in a 2021 Federal Register rule.
• An attempted push to make 67% of new cars fully electric by 2032, later scaled back.
• Approval of California's plan to ban the sale of new conventional gas-powered vehicles by 2035 — significant because California effectively sets standards for other states, with its emissions rules reaching roughly 40% of Americans.

Why does China's role matter?

The second strategic argument in the piece is supply-chain concentration. China produces more than 80% of the world's EV battery cells, according to the IEA's Global EV Outlook 2026, along with about 85% of cathode material and more than 90% of anode material — the key components inside those cells. Battery factories in the United States and Europe still rely heavily on imported components, most of them from China.

Ellis argues that policies rapidly shifting demand toward a technology whose supply chains sit concentrated in China can deepen that vulnerability before American producers are ready to fill the gap. "That concentration should concern anyone who has watched the U.S. spend years trying to unwind dangerous dependencies in strategic industries," he writes.

What is the proposed alternative?

The piece's prescription is competition plus permitting reform. Ellis calls on Washington to reform rules for building — mining and processing more critical minerals, manufacturing more batteries, and competing aggressively in innovative transportation. Automakers, in his view, should compete to build better EVs, more efficient hybrids, and improved gas-powered cars, with American workers manufacturing all three.

"Families can then decide what works best for them," he writes. The through-line is straightforward: affordability first, technology neutrality second, and no mandates forcing the transition before the supply chains exist to support it.