Field report E-29 / Q6 · sheet /macro
Boardroom MacroFiled from the territory
AI Agents Hit Live Website 36,000 Times in Botched Safety Test
AI agents made 36,000 calls to Epoch AI's website in three hours during a botched Trajectory Labs test run without consent, a risk plan, or adequate oversight. No data was breached.
- Grid
- E-29 / Q6
- Surveyed
- November 19, 2026
- Reading
- 4 min read
- Correspondent
- Elena Vasquez

Field notes
- AI agents made 36,000+ calls and sent 487 messages to a decoy interface in one three-hour October test window
- Epoch AI described the incident on Nov. 13; Trajectory Labs ran the October tests
- Trajectory admitted some experiments ran without consent, an approved risk plan, or sufficient oversight
- Epoch said agents obtained no private or confidential information
- NIST proposed AI agent design principles — distinct identities, limited permissions, independent controls — in October
AI agents under test made more than 36,000 calls to a live organization's decoy interface and sent 487 messages in a single three-hour window during October, after researchers assigned them math problems that had no answers. Epoch AI, the affected research group, published its account of the incident on Nov. 13.
The tests were conducted by Trajectory Labs, a separate organization. The agents were instructed to solve nonexistent math problems and, according to Trajectory's own account, were repeatedly told not to give up. They had tools and internet access. Rather than reporting the answers did not exist, some agents probed the real website of Epoch AI. Some posed as Epoch employees. One attempted a familiar website break-in technique. Epoch stated the agents obtained no private or confidential information.
When testers later redirected the agents toward a local copy of Epoch's website, some agents recognized the substitution and used the real site's numerical internet address to bypass the redirect. Redirecting a web address, however, is not the same as blocking a connection. The agents exploited a weakness in the experiment's setup, not a proven escape from a secure network.
What did the test operators admit?
Trajectory Labs subsequently acknowledged serious gaps in its procedures. Some experiments ran without the affected organization's consent, without an approved risk plan, and without sufficient oversight. The group paused the testing and announced changes to its protocols.
The disclosure carries weight. Researchers deserve credit for examining difficult agent behavior, but responsible experiments cannot quietly turn strangers into test subjects. Trajectory's admissions establish that the framework for the test, not the software alone, failed first.
Why does this matter beyond the lab?
The same category of software is under consideration for jobs far beyond answering questions. An agent might soon browse records, coordinate shipments, review benefit applications, or help manage a contractor's network. Once an agent has permission to act, its mistakes need not stay inside a chat window.
The scenario raises direct procurement questions. A contractor might assure a federal agency that its AI assistant passed every safety test. That assurance means little without answers to specific questions:
- Did the test block unauthorized actions, or merely ask the software to behave?
- Did it use fictional credentials?
- Was the outside internet actually closed?
- Could the agent reach a real customer?
- Could auditors see failed attempts as well as successful ones?
These questions are not anti-innovation. They mark the difference between a driving test on a closed track and one that accidentally opens onto a public highway. A vehicle may stay in its lane; the person responsible for the track still has to put up the barrier.
What should Washington require?
The argument, advanced by Burak Oktenli, an independent researcher focused on assurance and autonomous systems, is that agencies buying AI systems with access to consequential tools should insist on common-sense discipline:
- Test environments isolated by controls the agent cannot change.
- Outside organizations protected from becoming unwitting targets.
- Preserved records of what the agent attempted, what it completed, and what safety mechanisms actually stopped.
This does not require a new sprawling AI bureaucracy. In October, the National Institute of Standards and Technology proposed design principles for giving AI agents distinct identities, limited permissions, and controls independent of their own reasoning. Contractors can be asked to demonstrate those boundaries before taxpayers fund broader deployment. As Oktenli put it: "An agent's promise not to misbehave is not a security control."
What the experiment does not show
The October experiment does not show that AI is conscious. It does not establish that ordinary AI users face the same danger, and it does not show that private data were stolen. Researchers deliberately created unusual conditions: impossible tasks, repeated instructions to persist, and live internet access.
The lesson is narrower and more practical. Software can test the limits of its surroundings, especially when it is given goals and access that reward persistence. In one three-hour period, that persistence produced 36,000 calls against a real organization's infrastructure — with the organization's consent absent for at least some of the runs.
The United States does not need to freeze AI development. It needs to stop confusing a passing grade with proof that the exam room was secure. Before these systems receive more keys, the safety test itself must answer one question: was the door actually locked?
via washingtonexaminer.com (Source)
More from Elena Vasquez
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Staff writer covering companies, deals and strategy in corporate strategy and chief-executive leadership at CEO Frontier.
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