By Elena Vasquez

Nvidia has lost about $450 billion in market value since Jensen Huang admitted an affair, as the chipmaker opened an independent investigation into whether company or national-security secrets were compromised. Its board said Sunday it had no reason to believe either had been breached, but a committee of independent directors would examine all available information.

Former FBI counterintelligence operative Eric O’Neill said: “Sometimes the easiest way to penetrate a billion-dollar company is to get close to the person running it.” Huang’s departure has exposed a rarely discussed corporate risk: a CEO’s new business contact or budding romance may come from someone more interested in the company’s secrets.

O’Neill says protection must extend beyond technical controls. Executives need training to recognize manipulation, and another senior person must be able to intervene when the chief executive rejects warnings.

What changed after Huang stepped down?

Huang stepped down Thursday as Nvidia’s president, CEO and board member amid scrutiny of his relationship with a woman suspected of spying for China. The company, ranked No. 16 on the 2026 Fortune 500, named Chief Financial Officer Colette Kress interim CEO while directors search for a permanent successor.

• In a Sunday message to employees, Huang acknowledged being unfaithful to his wife and said he would cooperate with the board’s investigation.
• The New York Times reported that U.S. intelligence officials believed Alice Huang, a former executive at Singapore-based Megaspeed, had been recruited by China’s intelligence service.
• The Chinese government denied the allegations.

How can personal trust become an espionage channel?

O’Neill, whose undercover work helped the FBI capture spy Robert Hanssen, founded NeXasure AI and wrote Spies, Lies, and Cybercrime. He said intelligence-gathering often begins as an ordinary relationship and rarely starts with a demand for secrets.

The approach may take any of these forms:

• A conference.
• A business introduction.
• Drinks.
• A dating app.

The operative finds common ground, builds trust and makes the executive feel important.

Romance can accelerate access. Using romantic or sexual interest to obtain information, access or leverage is “honey trapping,” a tactic that predates dating apps.

O’Neill identified four warning signs:

• A relationship that develops unusually quickly.
• Persistent questions about sensitive business matters.
• Requests to meet influential colleagues.
• Encouragement to keep secrets.

The objective may be information, influence over a business decision, or compromising material usable for blackmail.

These signs become harder to detect when the person under scrutiny is someone the executive trusts. “By the time a security professional raises concerns, the executive may already be emotionally invested and unwilling to listen,” O’Neill said.

CEOs can reach intellectual property, strategic plans and government relationships, according to O’Neill. Their training should therefore show how a personal relationship might be used to approach those assets.

How should companies prepare senior executives?

Peter Warmka, a former CIA senior intelligence officer who trains executives through the Counterintelligence Institute, said his sessions cover who may target a company, what they want and how they approach employees and contractors. Senior executives remain prime targets because of their access.

“Unfortunately, they are also perceived as more vulnerable because many believe not all security measures imposed on lower-level employees also apply to them,” Warmka said.

His overseas-travel training focuses on three recurring risks:

• Electronic eavesdropping in hotel rooms and en route to meetings.
• Intelligence collection aimed at executives’ devices.
• Interpreters who may work for intelligence services.

Even with preparation, extraction remains difficult. “Well-trained operatives know how to elicit information without raising suspicion,” Warmka said.

How can boards intervene when a CEO will not listen?

O’Neill said companies should give three functions a confidential route to independent directors:

• Chief security officers.
• General counsel.
• Chief information security officers.

If the CEO will not cooperate, the board can appoint outside counsel and investigators to assess a credible threat and recommend protective measures. Where warranted, the company should involve federal authorities.

A romantic relationship alone does not prove espionage. Any review should remain objective and discreet, balance the executive’s privacy against company security, and place the risk assessment outside the relationship. “No executive, regardless of wealth, reputation, or brilliance, should be the final authority on investigating a threat in which that executive may be personally compromised,” O’Neill said.

Nvidia’s independent committee now controls the inquiry, and Huang has said he will cooperate; the central test is whether it can verify a credible threat without treating a relationship alone as proof of espionage.