In December 2025, President Donald Trump granted Nvidia permission to sell its H200 chip — an older but still powerful AI processor — to China, on the condition that the U.S. government received a percentage of the sales. That single decision, according to a Fortune commentary by Susan Ariel Aaronson, converted American export policy from a national security instrument into a revenue stream, and placed Nvidia at the center of what she calls the poster child of corruption in the United States.

The analysis applies Transparency International's definition of corruption: the abuse of entrusted authority for private gain.

How did a UN warning about AI come true?

In 2025, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Organization of American States co-convened a panel examining whether AI is the biggest corruption risk in history. The panelists feared AI would enable graft through easier money laundering, bribery and disinformation.

By November 2026, their fears materialized along a different path. The corruption of AI did not originate inside the technology, Aaronson argues, but with its leaders: heads of state, government officials and tech CEOs steering the direction of AI governance.

What did Nvidia and the administration actually do?

The Trump administration restricted chip sales to China in 2025, citing fears that the Chinese military could gain an advantage or that U.S. leadership in AI could be undermined. Nvidia's then-CEO Jensen Huang used flattery and donations to influence the administration's AI export policies, according to the account.

The December 2025 H200 arrangement produced a direct conflict: the U.S. government acquired a financial incentive to loosen controls on AI infrastructure flowing to China. AMD also received an exemption.

The Congressional Research Service, however, identified legal obstacles. Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits federal export taxes and duties (as opposed to user fees), and 50 U.S.C. §4815(c) bars the Bureau of Industry and Security from collecting fees for considering or issuing export licenses.

Who knew, and who failed to act?

Nvidia's General Counsel, Tim Teter, appeared to interfere in an investigation of Nvidia's sales to Chinese and Malaysian entities, according to reporting cited in the piece. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick was warned about the dangers surrounding Nvidia and its former CEO, yet took no action.

Aaronson's verdict is blunt: this corruption and inaction place U.S. national security and the American people at risk.

Why are export controls structurally vulnerable?

The OECD has warned that export controls, while potentially useful and necessary, are particularly vulnerable to corruption. Three structural factors drive that exposure:

• Export controls sit at the intersection of high-value restricted goods, bureaucratic gatekeeping and complex cross-border supply chains.
• Licensing systems concentrate discretionary power in officials who classify goods, issue licenses and clear shipments — creating opportunities to solicit bribes for faster approvals.
• U.S. agencies struggle to coordinate trade, customs and anti-corruption efforts, which are split across different authorities.

Restrictions also manufacture scarcity and outsized profits, especially for dual-use items (goods with both civilian and military applications) such as AI systems and chips. Some buyers will pay extreme prices for limited supply.

Where do Nvidia's rivals and clients stand?

Notably, the coalition pressing for tighter curbs includes Nvidia's own customers. Google, a producer of high-speed chips, supports restrictions. So do OpenAI, Amazon, Anthropic and Microsoft — three of Nvidia's biggest clients among them — which back legislation that would further limit Nvidia's ability to export chips to China, according to Politico and The Wall Street Journal reporting cited in the commentary.

What about oversight?

Export decisions frequently rest on classified intelligence and national security exemptions, leaving licensing and procurement processes opaque and difficult for independent watchdogs to audit. That weakness deepened in 2025, when the Trump administration fired many inspectors general — including at the Department of Commerce — along with anti-corruption prosecutors.

What should Congress do instead?

Aaronson concludes that export controls are not the best tool for keeping advanced AI out of adversaries' hands, precisely because they multiply opportunities for corruption. Politico has reported that members of Congress find it nearly impossible to support loosening export controls, and studies indicate such controls are rarely effective.

Current implementation can also damage U.S. economic and technological competitiveness, according to analyses from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security cited in the piece.

There are no easy answers, Aaronson concedes. Her recommendation: Congress should weigh a different approach, and the United States should coordinate with Western allies to manage technology transfers that threaten shared security interests.