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Boards & GovernanceFiled from the territory

Nvidia Earnings and Huang Ouster Expose the Limits of Governance Checklists

Nvidia raised forecasts under interim CEO Colette Kress as the SEC probes Jensen Huang, exposing how ISS and Glass Lewis checklists missed a board with no succession plan and no CEO-calibre directors.

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SE-30 / N4
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November 18, 2026
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5 min read
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Olivia Hart
Nvidia’s tutorial on genuine good governance, needed by tech bros and governistas alike
Fig. SE-30 / N4Nvidia’s tutorial on genuine good governance, needed by tech bros and governistas alike — MagicDesk / pixabay

Field notes

  1. Nvidia raised forecasts in its November 17 earnings release under interim CEO Colette Kress, as new board chair Harvey Jones closed the door on Jensen Huang's return.
  2. Jensen Huang faces four ongoing government investigations, multiple shareholder lawsuits, and an SEC probe of both him and Nvidia.
  3. In June, shareholders re-elected all ten Nvidia directors; Huang won 99% of the vote and ISS backed the entire slate.
  4. No Nvidia director has ever run an S&P 500 company or has national security experience; Huang had 60+ direct reports and no COO.
  5. Stanford researchers found no significant correlation between ISS's flagship governance rating and five measures of company outcomes.

Nvidia raised its forecasts in an earnings release on November 17 that proved the company can flourish without Jensen Huang — even as Huang publicly volunteered to return while facing four ongoing government investigations. Interim CEO Colette Kress ran the earnings call with what observers called command, presence, and impressive candour, while new board chair Harvey Jones closed the door on Huang's return amid news that the SEC is now probing both Huang and Nvidia.

For practitioners, the earnings result settles one question: Nvidia's underlying business strength is far greater than any one individual. Charles de Gaulle's line — "The graveyards are filled with indispensable men" — now reads as the verdict on the "Bring Jensen Back" movement.

What does the fight over Huang's exit actually reveal?

Two camps have rushed to misread the crisis, according to the original commentary. A band of tech bros, decrying "woke" management policies they believe pushed Huang out, has advocated his messianic return despite ongoing investigations into apparent code-of-conduct violations and unresolved national security concerns. Pavel Durov, Telegram's founder, captured the fantasy in an X post: "Jensen made a rookie mistake. He had a board." The counterargument: any executive entrusted with other people's money owes fiduciary duty to shareholders first, above self-enrichment.

On the other side, self-declared "governistas" have offered solutions the author calls irrelevant clichés. Charlie Elson of the University of Delaware blamed dual-class shares in Directors & Boards — even though Nvidia has a single-class stock structure and has never had dual-class shares. Elson argued: "in the end, this may spark, and I hope it does, a real reconsideration of the whole notion of dual-class stock in publicly traded companies." Governance professor Richard LeBlanc of York University proposed an independent chair — even though Nvidia already had an independent lead director, Stephen Neal, former CEO of Cooley Law Firm.

Why did the ISS and Glass Lewis checklists miss everything?

Nvidia was a proxy-advisory showpiece. Every director but Huang was technically independent, with independent audit, compensation and governance committees, annual elections, and one vote per share. Nvidia had no chairman at all until Huang left. In June, shareholders re-elected all ten directors, with Huang receiving 99% of the vote and ISS supporting the entire slate, as it has each year for many years.

The track record of box-checking is damning:

  • Enron had 12 independent directors among 14, split the chairman and CEO roles in its final year, and was named one of America's five best boards in 2000 — before the fraud was exposed.
  • Silicon Valley Bank had an independent chair and an otherwise entirely independent board.
  • 10 of Lehman Brothers' 11 directors were independent.
  • Stanford researchers tested ISS's flagship governance rating against five outcome measures, including restatements, shareholder lawsuits and stock performance, and found no significant correlation with any of them.

The author's 2002 Harvard Business Review piece, "What Makes Great Boards Great," made the same point about Enron-era boards: they followed most accepted standards, with audit committees, codes of ethics and directors with personal money invested. The failure mode is Goodhart's Law — confusing the metric with the underlying phenomenon.

What actually failed at Nvidia?

Not structure, but the calibre and culture of directors. No Nvidia director has ever run an S&P 500 company, and none has national security experience — at a company whose chips are a national security asset. Microsoft, IBM and Dell each have at least four current or former big-company CEOs on their boards; Nvidia had none.

The board was asleep on succession planning: Huang had more than 60 direct reports, no president or chief operating officer beneath him, and ran business through handshake deals that centralized power in himself. When the crisis came, the board's first instinct was to vouch for Huang before its own investigation had begun. Deferring to advisors also proved insufficient — PwC signed off on financial reports that many experts consider questionable accounting, obfuscating the geographic origins of Nvidia's revenues and the end users of sensitive chips in ways that could expose the board to oversight-failure or even fraud claims.

Huang himself issued an unusual statement on the morning of the earnings release: "If the Board of Directors decides that my return is in the best interest of our shareholders, our employees, the company, and America, I would be honored to answer these calls and return as CEO." He is now the target of four ongoing government investigations across congressional oversight and federal probes, plus multiple shareholder lawsuits. Proxy firm Egan Jones has lent implicit support to the return movement, declaring "It is not entirely clear the board acted in the best interest of shareholders" in removing him.

How should boards work with founder-monarchs?

Former SEC Chairman and Yale SOM Dean Bill Donaldson put it at a Yale CEO Summit: "The least examined is that it is a social entity. It has human beings on it… Perhaps there's a group that's aligned improperly, and that group dominates either through tenure on the board or whatever and allows bad things to go on."

The playbook exists. Microsoft, Amazon, Dell, Starbucks and Apple each forged alignment between founder visionaries — Gates, Bezos, Dell, Schultz, Jobs — and shareholders, pairing non-accusatory accountability with credible succession planning. Nvidia's board, by contrast, lacked the stature to contain Huang's impulses; it could only retain and worship. The lesson: nobody can legislate board performance through checklists or rulebooks — the solution is professional courage, not structure.

via fortune.com/feed/ (Source)

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News editor covering regulation, policy and their impact on corporate strategy and chief-executive leadership at CEO Frontier.

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End of sheetSE-30 / N4 · November 18, 2026