Field report NE-94 / Q1 · sheet /expansion

Expansion & MarketsFiled from the territory

Eskom’s 5,200 MW nuclear plan still faces execution risks

Eskom has submitted a feasibility programme for 5,200 MW of nuclear capacity. Procurement still requires a published determination, regulatory scrutiny and proof that delivery skills can be rebuilt.

Grid
NE-94 / Q1
Surveyed
November 17, 2026
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4 min read
Correspondent
Sophie Lindqvist
Eskom sets its sights on building new nuclear capacity in South Africa
Fig. NE-94 / Q1Eskom sets its sights on building new nuclear capacity in South Africa — ulleo / pixabay

Field notes

  1. Eskom submitted a feasibility programme for 5,200 MW of nuclear capacity aligned with IRP 2025.
  2. Three controls frame the route: public participation, publication as a statutory procurement trigger, and independent safety and licensing.
  3. The Nuclear Energy Policy assigns Eskom the owner-and-operator role and control under a public-private partnership.
  4. Ramokgopa said South Africa had not built a nuclear power plant in the past 50 years or so.
  5. The department and Eskom are reviewing the coal fleet by plant condition, cost and environmental requirements.

By Sophie Lindqvist

Eskom has submitted a feasibility programme for a 5,200 MW nuclear energy programme aligned with South Africa’s Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) 2025, which sets out plans to install new nuclear capacity. Ramokgopa’s address disclosed no plant sites, reactor count, budget, financing plan or construction schedule.

Minister Ramokgopa delivered the keynote address at the South African Nuclear and Clean Energy Conference, held under the theme “Transitioning from Policy to Execution: Powering a Secure, Sustainable and Industrialised Future.” His speech advanced the proposal, but it did not disclose an approval to begin construction.

What does the 5,200 MW programme change?

For manufacturers, investors and households, the practical change is a formal route to consider 5,200 MW of additional nuclear supply. It does not create electricity, commit procurement or guarantee lower tariffs, because none of those outcomes has an established date or financing basis.

Ramokgopa linked new capacity to industrial expansion, new investment and household access to affordable electricity. He warned that insufficient capacity produces higher-cost supply and suppresses production and investment that would otherwise occur.

The speech offered no demand forecast, tariff calculation or commissioning timetable. That omission leaves the promised economic gain unquantified despite the government’s determination to support faster industrial growth.

Ramokgopa said: “The department is preparing a proposed determination for public participation. We will put the case for additional capacity before the public and consider submissions on their merits.” He said decisions should turn on scientific and evidential merit, rather than an in-principle objection to nuclear power or an obsession with one technology over another.

The route now rests on three stated controls. The sequence covers public participation, the legal procurement trigger and nuclear safety oversight:

  • The department prepares and publishes a proposed government determination after public participation (consultation with the public).
  • Publication of the determination is a statutory trigger (the legal event that opens procurement).
  • The National Nuclear Regulator will exercise independent authority over safety and licensing.

The Nuclear Energy Policy designates Eskom as the owner and operator of nuclear plants and provides for Eskom to retain control under a public-private partnership (a joint public and private sector arrangement). It identifies Eskom’s institutional role, but Ramokgopa did not explain how control, financing and risk would be shared.

None of the stated stages has a disclosed completion date, and the speech named no reactor technology, supplier or site. Procurement remains conditional on publication of the determination, while safety and licensing remain subject to the regulator’s independent decisions.

Execution capacity remains the central test

Ramokgopa identified the absence of recent construction experience as one of the programme’s biggest inherent risks. South Africa has not built a nuclear power plant in the past 50 years or so, according to the minister.

Ramokgopa said: “There are people who have experienced how to build a nuclear power station. So, we don’t have them in abundance.” He said the expertise available at Koeberg supports operating an already-built station, not constructing one from scratch.

His remedy is to work with international partners to build a pipeline of engineers capable of constructing a nuclear station from scratch. The country would accumulate experience as it builds the first, second and third reactors, creating sufficient capacity and capability eventually to stand on its own.

No international partner, recruitment target, training programme or construction schedule was named. The promise of self-reliance therefore depends on whether construction starts and sustains a succession of projects.

Government has also learned from what Ramokgopa described as the sad past surrounding the Kusile and Medupi build programmes. He said the earlier programme showed how not to approach the task, warning that poor planning must not make the new nuclear programme a casualty. The address offered no independent assurance that those planning and delivery problems would not recur.

What happens to coal?

The department, working with Eskom, is reviewing the coal fleet on its own merits. Some stations may have a case for longer operation, while others will retire; each decision must reflect plant conditions, costs and applicable environmental requirements.

Ramokgopa said coal and nuclear can operate alongside one another. He presented nuclear as dependable, low carbon and cost-effective, positioning it to support economic growth and diversify electricity supply.

Those remain government claims rather than demonstrated findings. The address supplied no comparative cost data, emissions assessment, retirement timetable or list of candidate coal plants for continued operation.

The 5,200 MW figure therefore marks the scale of policy intent, not a financed construction programme. The next verifiable steps are publication of the proposed determination, consideration of public submissions, procurement triggered by that publication, and independent safety and licensing decisions.

Until those steps yield a defined project, businesses cannot treat new nuclear capacity as committed supply. The speech also gives households no evidence-based basis for expecting lower electricity prices or greater affordability.

via bizcommunity.com (Source)

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Correspondent covering money, funding and market shifts around corporate strategy and chief-executive leadership at CEO Frontier.

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End of sheetNE-94 / Q1 · November 17, 2026