Field report W-79 / M8 · sheet /macro
Boardroom MacroFiled from the territory
Democrats Won Congress. Now They Must Rebuild Trade Policy
A former Trump-administration trade negotiator says Democrats must revive TPA and require tariff approval, after both parties' unilateral tariffs failed workers and allies alike.
- Grid
- W-79 / M8
- Surveyed
- November 17, 2026
- Reading
- 4 min read
- Correspondent
- Olivia Hart

Field notes
- Manufacturing production wages rose 6.6% from January 2025 to October 2026, barely ahead of 5.8% inflation.
- China pledged $588 million in aid to Cambodia in 2019 while the U.S. and EU weighed trade reprisals over worker rights.
- The 2025 U.S.-Cambodia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade promised labor protections the ILO says Cambodia still violates.
- Biden let Trade Promotion Authority lapse; Trump used it only once, for the USMCA.
Days after winning Congress, Democrats are split over what to do with tariff power — and a former trade negotiator who served in the first Trump administration says both parties have already run the experiment and it failed.
The debate inside the party has two camps, according to Desiree Leclercq, writing in Fortune. Some Democrats want to rein in Donald Trump's sweeping tariffs on allies such as Canada. Others want a 2029 Democratic president to redirect those same expansive tariffs toward progressive priorities, including raising labor standards abroad. Both camps, she argues, miss two things: they blame trade failures on Trump alone, when the Trump and Biden administrations pursued similar policies, and they focus on clawing back presidential tariff power while ignoring Congress's role in setting trade objectives.
Leclercq, a progressive who spent her career, including as a trade negotiator in the first Trump administration, trying to make trade work for American workers, urges congressional Democrats to absorb the lessons of both administrations. That requires a course correction, she writes — even if it means restraining a future Democratic president.
What did both administrations actually do?
Congress once shared control over trade policy through Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). Under TPA, Congress linked its up-or-down vote on trade agreements to negotiation objectives that included enforceable labor and environmental standards. Both administrations, Leclercq writes, essentially ignored it.
Trump used TPA once, for the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. Biden never used it, let it lapse, and redirected resources into domestic production. Both presidents relied instead on decades-old tariff statutes that alienated allies and raised consumer prices.
The results were concrete, she argues:
- Partners turned to China for support while allies signed trade agreements without the United States.
- Under Biden's domestic policies, U.S. factory production fell and manufacturing jobs stalled.
- Even Biden's self-described "worker-centered" trade policy did not change the pattern.
"We tried that theory. It didn't work for us, and it hasn't since," Leclercq writes of using tariffs to force better labor standards abroad.
Why tariffs don't improve labor rights
When Leclercq negotiated in the first Trump administration, both Democrats and Republicans pressed her team to use tariffs and sanctions to make countries treat their workers better. The theory held that market leverage would force higher labor and environmental standards abroad and level the field for U.S. businesses that already meet those standards.
Trade partners resist that pressure for valid reasons, she writes. They do not want to appear weak to their constituents, and U.S. market leverage is not the decisive weapon policymakers assume. Governments can turn to China for financial support.
Cambodia supplies the clearest case. In 2019, while the United States and the European Union considered withdrawing trade benefits over worker-rights violations, China pledged $588 million in aid to Phnom Penh. While Washington waited for Cambodia to yield, The Wall Street Journal reported in July 2019 on a draft agreement granting China's navy a 30-year lease at Cambodia's Ream base.
What did tariffs do for American workers?
Progressives rightly champion workers losing jobs to global trade, Leclercq writes. But tariff policy does not protect U.S. workers from job loss — it taxes them at the grocery store and wherever their jobs depend on steady, affordable supplies of steel and aluminum.
The wage data underline the point. The average hourly wage for manufacturing production workers rose 6.6 percent from January 2025 to October 2026, only slightly ahead of 5.8 percent inflation over the same period.
Why Congress needs a slower process
By letting its trade authority lapse, Congress gave up its main say in trade negotiations, Leclercq argues. The result has been rushed deals with unrealistic commitments. The Agreement on Reciprocal Trade between the United States and Cambodia, negotiated in months in 2025, committed Cambodia to protect internationally recognized labor rights, including freedom of association and prohibitions against forced labor. The International Labor Organization recently found that Cambodia still violates those standards.
The Cambodia deal would have been more realistic, she writes, if Congress had required Cambodia to amend its laws before the deal could be finalized.
Patient efforts under the USMCA show the alternative. With time to debate the labor-rights commitments domestically, Mexico passed critical labor legislation to protect independent trade unions.
What should the new majority do in January?
A new Democratic majority, Leclercq writes, must revive deliberative processes in trade policy. Her prescription has three parts:
- Require transparent, participatory consultations at home, including trade-sector workers and their representatives.
- Require trade partners to consult their own businesses and workers before agreeing to labor and environmental commitments.
- Require congressional approval for new tariffs, as Democratic leaders now promise, and enact a new TPA centered on worker and stakeholder participation at home and abroad.
President Trump will likely veto both measures, she concedes. But forcing the vetoes would put on record that he prefers unchecked trade power over new agreements that would benefit U.S. companies and workers. Congress would still have drafts ready for whoever takes power in 2029.
For practitioners, the takeaway is a reversal of the current sequencing: Congress writes the objectives and the consultations first, and the tariffs — if any — follow from a mandate rather than from a decades-old statute.
via fortune.com/feed/ (Source)
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News editor covering regulation, policy and their impact on corporate strategy and chief-executive leadership at CEO Frontier.
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