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Commerce's First Chip Export Rule Since Nvidia Scandal Targets Singapore

Commerce's first export control update since the Nvidia scandal closes the remote access loophole for AI chips and adds Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil. Four bills in Congress await.

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NE-28 / L6
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November 17, 2026
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6 min read
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Olivia Hart
The Nvidia scandal fuels tougher China chip rules as Commerce targets Singapore and Malaysia
Fig. NE-28 / L6The Nvidia scandal fuels tougher China chip rules as Commerce targets Singapore and Malaysia — AI-generated

Field notes

  1. Commerce issued its first export control update since the Nvidia scandal on Monday, Nov. 16, as an interim final rule
  2. Licenses now required for advanced AI chip exports to data centers in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil; data centers serving Chinese-headquartered firms get 90 days
  3. Jensen Huang resigned as Nvidia's CEO on Thursday, Nov. 13, 2026
  4. Reuters reported roughly 600,000 Nvidia H200s sitting in Hong Kong awaiting Chinese import approval
  5. The MATCH Act would give Japan and the Netherlands 150 days to align controls with Washington
  6. Approximately 600,000 H200s remain in Hong Kong as China withholds import approval for Nvidia chips

The Commerce Department issued its first export control update since the Nvidia scandal broke on Monday morning, expanding controls to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil and closing the loophole that let Chinese firms reach AI chips sitting in overseas data centers.

The rule lands three days after Jensen Huang resigned as Nvidia's CEO on Thursday, removing the loudest industry voice against restrictions on chip and chipmaking equipment sales to China. Huang had argued such measures would spur a competing Chinese chip industry and that it was better to keep Chinese companies hooked on U.S. technology.

He also backed open-source AI models, many developed by Chinese firms such as DeepSeek, against claims they posed serious cybersecurity risks. Revelations of his affair with Alice Huang, a former executive at Singapore-based Megaspeed suspected of funnelling controlled chips to China, have undermined his credibility on export controls. Some reports say U.S. intelligence viewed Alice Huang as part of a Chinese espionage campaign against Nvidia; others dispute that assessment.

What does the new Commerce rule actually require?

Licenses would now be required to export advanced AI chips to data centers in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil. Large data center operators anywhere in the world would also need a license to grant access to companies headquartered in China, effectively shutting the remote access loophole. Data centers already serving Chinese-headquartered firms get 90 days from the effective date to obtain a license.

The rule takes effect immediately once published in the Federal Register. Commerce's press release notes the rules were "written by and at the direction of the Department of Treasury and the National Security Council," a detail that signals continued division inside the Trump administration over smuggling enforcement.

Existing controls already block the most advanced AI processors from Nvidia, AMD and Intel from being sold to Chinese companies, though the administration has permitted Nvidia's H200 to approved Chinese customers. Chipmaking equipment and high-bandwidth memory are also restricted.

How likely is Congress to act?

Hanna Dohmen, a senior research analyst at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology, said before the rule's release: "The regulatory path in Washington is going to be harder and bumpier." She noted several bills sit in this year's National Defense Authorization Act. The Huang scandal "adds momentum to push those bills through, and the chance of those passing are likelier than ever."

Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, added: "No matter what Trump does, it's possible that Congress should be able to provide limitations. It's not only about Trump anymore."

Four bills are advancing:

  • Remote Access Security Act — Seeks to close the remote access loophole, giving Commerce authority to license and penalize foreign companies tapping advanced U.S. AI chips from abroad. The House passed it in January; the Senate has yet to consider it.
  • Chip Security Act — Requires advanced chips to ship with location tracking and other security measures so processors cannot be diverted after export, and forces exporters to disclose evidence of diversion or smuggling. It stops short of mandating kill switches.
  • AI Overwatch Act — Treats advanced chips like weapons: the administration would notify Congress before any sale to China or other adversaries, and Congress could block the deal with a joint resolution of disapproval. An "America First AI" provision requires Commerce to certify that exports will not leave U.S. customers short of computing power.
  • MATCH Act — The most aggressive proposal, largely banning the sale and servicing of deep ultraviolet lithography tools across China and imposing broader restrictions on facilities tied to major Chinese chipmakers such as SMIC and CXMT. It gives Japan and the Netherlands 150 days to align with Washington, failing which the U.S. can extend controls to equipment from those countries even without U.S.-made components.

Rules alone will not halt smuggling, Dohmen warned, because enforcement still matters: knowing a chip was smuggled counts for little if the Bureau of Industry and Security does not act.

How do Singapore and Malaysia respond?

Megaspeed, accused of funnelling Nvidia chips to China, sits in Singapore, and Malaysia reportedly hosted its data centers. The company denies sending chips to China. Both Singapore and Malaysia have made public moves against smuggling, but Kurlantzick is "more inclined" to believe Singapore is taking the matter seriously, while Malaysia "wasn't really doing anything, and didn't care." His read: "The U.S. is insanely unpopular in Malaysia."

Jennifer Lind, associate professor of government at Dartmouth College, frames the intent: "The administration wants to encourage Malaysia and Singapore to remain in the American AI ecosystem, but it doesn't want them to become conduits through which Chinese firms can obtain advanced chips—or remotely access the computing power those chips provide. That has been its policy so far and I don't anticipate this changing."

The rule carves out end-users that are, or are owned by, a U.S.-headquartered company. The region has drawn billions from U.S. tech firms including Microsoft, Oracle and Amazon, which should qualify, though the remote access limits still apply to them.

For Malaysia's ambitions, the risk is direct. Kurlantzick said: "For Malaysia, the controls could be disastrous. From what Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim sees, their biggest potential future industry is a data center and AI hub for Chinese companies."

Washington is also pressing Southeast Asian states into its "Pax Silica" framework for semiconductor and critical mineral supply chains that bypass China, against Beijing's competing World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization. Trump is in Manila this week for the ASEAN Summit, where he is expected to push countries toward Pax Silica and answer questions on the expanded rules. Kurlantzick doubts the approach: "The U.S. isn't really offering Southeast Asian countries—or really anyone in Asia—much in return for their demands."

Does China still care about export controls?

The main barrier to chips entering China now sits in Beijing, not Washington. The Chinese government has largely withheld permission for its companies to import Nvidia chips and pushed them toward domestic alternatives such as Huawei's. DeepSeek has led the push to run Chinese AI models well on Huawei's Ascend processors.

"Export controls still matter," Lind said, though she conceded they may matter less now. "China is already well on its way toward developing its own AI ecosystem; Huawei makes its own chips for training and running AI models, and a software platform (CANN) that's an alternative to Nvidia's CUDA ecosystem." She is watching "whether semiconductor manufacturing equipment continues to be restricted—whether China develops the capability to manufacture its own frontier chips." The Trump administration continues to restrict SME exports, she said, and likely will continue.

Huawei's Ascend processors remain below the best Nvidia silicon, especially for training models.

The roughly 600,000 H200s gathering dust in Hong Kong, Reuters reported, now look more attractive if Chinese companies lose overseas access. Dohmen asked: "Would the Chinese government be more willing to let those H200s flow into China?" Her conclusion: "China does not have the capacity at this point to meet that demand."

via fortune.com/feed/ (Source)

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News editor covering regulation, policy and their impact on corporate strategy and chief-executive leadership at CEO Frontier.

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